


Provably Secure Blockchain Protocols from Distributed Proof-of-Deep-Learning

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Outline

- Background: Blockchain Basic
- Our Contributions:
 - Distributed Proof-of-Deep-Learning (D-PoDL) Scheme
 - Provably Secure D-PoDL-Based Blockchain Protocols
- Summary and Future Works

Blockchain Basic: Structure

- Data: message (transaction, tx) & block
- Structure: Hash chain of blocks



Blockchain Basic: Proof-of-Work (PoW)¹

- Data: message (transaction, tx) \in block
- Structure: Chaining blocks with hash
- PoW: Block generation with parameter T



Find nonce, s.t., $\text{hash}(\text{prevBK}, \text{nonce}) \leq T$

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
- For $\text{hash}: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$, PoW is expected to require $\frac{2^n}{T}$ -hash evaluations

Blockchain Basic: PoW

- Data: message (transaction, tx) \in block
- Structure: Chaining blocks with hash
- PoW: Block generation with parameter T
=> Have ``enough (?)'' time to send blocks


Blockchain Basic: PoW

- Data: message (transaction, tx) \in block
- Structure: Chaining blocks with hash
- PoW: Block generation with parameter T
 - => Have ``enough (?)`` time to send blocks
 - => Forks




Blockchain Basic: Forks and Chain Selections

- The longest-chain-rule² and the weight-based selection^{3,4}



- Why is the fork guaranteed to die out?
 - PoW is bounded by computing power
 - The honest majority assumption (Up-to 1/2 corruption)

Blockchain Basic: Security²



- Persistence: For any honest chain C_1 and C_2 in time slot $t_1 < t_2$, after pruning several latest blocks in C_1 , C_1 is the prefix of C_2
- Liveness: Any honest message (tx) will eventually be embedded in all honest users' blockchain

A Problem of the PoW

Find nonce, s.t., $\text{hash}(\text{prevBK}, \text{nonce}) \leq T$

- That hash iterations seem quite wasteful
 - And rather meaningless outside the PoW
- Can we replace it with something more **useful**?

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=> Proof-of-useful-work (PoUW)^{5,6}

Given **task**, run **Solve(task)** -> proof, s.t.,
Verify(task, proof) = 1

The Useful Work

- Worst-case assumptions fine-grained complexity theory⁵
 - Stochastic local search algorithm⁶
 - **Deep Learning (DL) Tasks**
 - A model should be accurate enough to be useful
 - Training a model requires sufficient computing power
- => Proof-of-Deep-Learning (PoDL)⁷⁻¹⁰

General Setup from Existing Works

- Participants: Task publishers, provers, and verifiers
- Task: (dataset D , accuracy threshold T_{acc})
- Prover Goal: Find a model that has accuracy surpassing T_{acc}

A Few Drawbacks

- Strong Assumptions:
 - Separation between publisher and prover^{7,9,10}
 - Strong synchronous to publish test dataset^{7,8}
- Some Waste Computing Power:
 - “Somehow” trained models cannot be reused^{7-10*}
- No Explicit Security Analysis^{7-10*}

*10 considered pre-determined short-term targets;

*10 has proof against double spending attack.


Additional Requirements

- No-grinding attack (cherry-picking parameters)
- Pre-computation resilience
- Adjustable difficulty
- Efficient verification
- Usefulness measurement


Our Approach (Intuition)

- Setting:
 - Focus on training dataset and accuracy
 - AND consider test ones to prevent overfitting (in protocol)
- Goal: Distribute task solving among provers (D-PoDL)
 - Hash-training-hash structure
 - Model-referencing mechanism

Scheme Overview




Scheme Overview




The PreHash Algorithm

- A PoW with low difficulty T_1
- Hash-to-architecture mapping: $HtoA(h_1)=(hpp, \text{initLP}, r)$
- Prevent grinding attack and pre-computation attack




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
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


Model-Referencing in PreHash


- Usually, training others model is forbidden
 - Achieve similar accuracy with less training iterations
=> However, pre-trained models are wasted
- => Provers should make **clear references**



Scheme Overview




Main Training Algorithm



- Choose training algorithm e.g., the SGD algorithm
- Result model: $M=(h_{pp}, l_{p^*})$,
- Corresponding accuracy and step number: $(acc, \#step)$
- Checkpoints: $CPs=\{(M_i, acc_i, \#step_i)\}$

Scheme Overview




The PostHash Algorithm

- One hash check
- If true, publish
- If false, return to PreHash & Train

=> More training iterations

=> Adjust overall difficulty




Model Verification


- Naïve approach: Reproduce the whole training
- Considering efficiency

=> Merkle-tree-based verification on checkpoints^{10,11}


Transform to Blockchain Protocol




Publishers and Tasks




Referred Models: Model Transaction (mtx)



Block Generation




Chain Selection




Concrete Chain Selection Rules

- Longest-Chain Rule²:
 - $\mathcal{R}(\text{acc}, T_{acc})=1$ if $\text{acc} \geq T_{acc}$; Otherwise $\mathcal{R}(\text{acc}, T_{acc})=0$
 - Miners choose the longest blockchain
- Weight-Based Framework⁴:
 - Assign weight to blocks according to $\mathcal{R}(\text{acc}, T_{acc})$
 - Lower accuracy has lower weight
 - Miners choose the heaviest blockchain


Consider Test Dataset **after** Chain Selection



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


Consider Test Dataset **after** Chain Selection



Cross Time Slot Attacks


- Refer to **old/new models**, and extend **new/old blocks**



Less iteration, break the block generation rate

Cross Time Slot Attacks


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- Mitigation: Restrict step number in block_adv
- $(\#step_adv + \#step_M')$ cannot be significantly less

Cross Time Slot Attacks

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
- Mitigation: Restrict reference

Security for D-PoDL-Based Blockchain

- Good period: Block generation follows an expected rate
- Good period guarantees persistence and liveness²
- Probability of periods being good is 1 minus negligible

Implementation of D-PoDL Scheme

- Compare to PoW and plain DL tasks (MNIST dataset)
- Stable rate with enough randomness to prevent domination



*D-PoDL parameter follows (T_{acc}, T_1, T_2)

Summary

- A design for distributed PoUW based on DL tasks (D-PoDL)
- Blockchain with different selection rules from the D-PoDL
- Prove security for the protocol and implement the scheme

Future Works

- Checkpoints are storage-demanding
=> Potential for proof-of-space¹²
- Parameter adjustment is hard
=> Feedback loops
- Incentive model and rational analysis

Thank you!

References

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